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Abstract
In this paper I am concerned with human agency and the construction of social organization. I am suggesting
three concepts of human agency derived (a) from radical constructivism and autopoiesis, (b) from interactive
use of language, and (c) from my work in the sociology of design. The former provides a background for
human agency. The latter lead to two concepts of organization that acknowledge human agency in slightly
different ways. In that process I am extending the second-order cybernetic idea of putting the observer into
the observed to acknowledging the agency of humans in the construction of social organization of which they
are a part. I think, talking about social systems as if that talk had nothing to do with the systems it brings about
gets us back into first-order cybernetics, perhaps with the awareness that we are the observers of social
systems. So, I will be concerned not with observation but with constituting social reality by participating in it
constitutively. I am opposed to trivializing human agency that takes place when adopting vocabularies from
discourses that cannot reflect on their communicative roles.
The most blatant trivialization of human agency that I observe is found in the design of "agent based computer
programming," attributing agency to particular algorithms on account of being useful to computer users. One
may take this use of agency as merely metaphorical, much as opening files and documents in human-
computer interfaces are metaphors of what happens behind the screen, but the latter should not be confused
with human agency. A more serious trivialization of human agency can be seen in the Actor-Network Theory
(ANT) of M. Callon (1986) and Bruno Latour (1997), attributing agency to text, images and technological
artifacts alike. A third example is to talk of social systems as abstractions from the everyday practices of living,
sociological abstractions in particular, in effect generalizing and offering causal relationships between these
abstractions in which human agency – intentionality, choices, actions, purposes, language and communication
– which is important in social life, is no longer recognizable, thereby delivering the human use of human
beings to those who are able to use their human agency irresponsibly and unchecked.
However, in this paper I will take Richard Rorty's (1989) suggestion to heart not to get sidetracked into
critically reviewing what I am opposing and I shall propose instead vocabulary of what I am favoring, keeping
in mind why I am doing this.
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Abstract 
In this paper I am concerned with human agency and the construction of social 
organization. I am suggesting three concepts of human agency derived (a) from radical 
constructivism and autopoiesis, (b) from interactive use of language, and (c) from my work in the 
sociology of design. The former provides a background for human agency. The latter lead to two 
concepts of organization that acknowledge human agency in slightly different ways. In that process 
I am extending the second-order cybernetic idea of putting the observer into the observed to 
acknowledging the agency of humans in the construction of social organization of which they are 
a part. I think, talking about social systems as if that talk had nothing to do with the systems it 
brings about gets us back into first-order cybernetics, perhaps with the awareness that we are the 
observers of social systems. So, I will be concerned not with observation but with constituting 
social reality by participating in it constitutively. I am opposed to trivializing human agency that 
takes place when adopting vocabularies from discourses that cannot reflect on their communicative 
roles. 
The most blatant trivialization of human agency that I observe is found in the design of 
"agent based computer programming," attributing agency to particular algorithms on account of 
being useful to computer users. One may take this use of agency as merely metaphorical, much as 
opening files and documents in human-computer interfaces are metaphors of what happens behind 
the screen, but the latter should not be confused with human agency. A more serious trivialization 
of human agency can be seen in the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) of M. Callon (1986) and Bruno 
Latour (1997), attributing agency to text, images and technological artifacts alike. A third example 
is to talk of social systems as abstractions from the everyday practices of living, sociological 
abstractions in particular, in effect generalizing and offering causal relationships between these 
abstractions in which human agency – intentionality, choices, actions, purposes, language and 
communication – which is important in social life, is no longer recognizable, thereby delivering 
the human use of human beings to those who are able to use their human agency irresponsibly and 
unchecked. 
However, in this paper I will take Richard Rorty's (1989) suggestion to heart not to get 
sidetracked into critically reviewing what I am opposing and I shall propose instead vocabulary of 
what I am favoring, keeping in mind why I am doing this. 
  
Observeration Versus Participation 
Adopted largely from the natural sciences, the position from which sociologists prefer to 
theorize their subject matter is that of detached observers, spectators of unfolding events, who 
see no reason to include themselves in what they are theorizing. For social scientists, this position 
has considerable practical advantages. 
First, it gives theorists considerable freedom to develop theories whose validity criteria are 
housed solely in the theorist's discourse community. Indeed, definitions of sociology, as of any 
social science discourse, include institutionalized validity criteria that are constitutive of (the) 
discipline. Complying with them gives discourse practitioners assurances that the theories they 
propose are acceptable within their discourse community, but not necessarily outside of it. 
Frequent universalist truth claims notwithstanding, sociological theory deals with the subject 
matter of sociology and psychological theory deals with the subject matter of psychology, not with 
religious topics, not with theories of physics, each upholding their own validity criteria. 
Second, and especially when a discourse arms itself with specialized methods of 
observation and techniques of analysis, e.g., statistical ones, whose use is not shared with those 
observed, theorist assure themselves a position that is superior to those observed, a superiority 
that scientists generally enjoy and defend. This superiority is manifest in the use of a 
representational language, void of first person references, in fact implying a God's eye view of the 
universe, a position from everywhere and nowhere. 
Third, taking this position allows the social theorist to deny accountability to those 
theorized, believing in the convenient illusion that the data they have "found" in an undisturbed 
nature are the sole arbiter of the theories they promote, not what their theories do. Those theorized 
are referred to in third person plural terms, as "they," which defines "them" outside the social 
scientific discourse, denying "them" the right to hold the theorist accountable to what their theories 
do. 
Forth, detached observers, spectators, of events that unfold in front of their eyes are unable 
to determine why something happens the way it is observed. Members of theatre or movie 
audiences, for example, cannot know whether or the extent to which what they see is scripted in 
detail and mechanically executed or the result of spontaneous and intentional human interaction – 
unless they know the script, believe an authority on the performers' intentions, or can ask questions 
of them. Because asking questions would interfere with the performance and thus violate the ideal 
of objectivity, coupled with prescription of Occam's razor to take the simplest of several 
explanation for the truth, leads to causal explanations. In traditional scientific pursuits, causal 
explanations have become the preferred explanation if not the only acceptable form, 
notwithstanding that they trivialize those observed and certainly deny their agency. Causal 
explanations, explanations in terms of mechanisms are not natural; they are the artifact of detached 
observation. 
Displaying human agency in creating theories that in turn deny human agency to those 
theorized therein – denial of reflexivity – can be seen as a kind of intellectual oppression 
of those theorized (Krippendorff, 1996). 
The alternative to detached accounts of observations is to acknowledge one's involvement 
in the phenomenon of interest, to offer accounts of how one's actions and use of language reveals 
a reality interacted with, to account for what one sees as an accomplishment, in one 
word: participation. To approach this position, I will briefly summarize the lessons learned from 
Ernst von Glasersfeld's radical constructivism and Humberto Maturana's biological conception 
of cognition as networks of operations. Then I will describe two conceptions of social 
organization. The first builds on language and leads to a conception of organizations 
as reconstitutable networks of conversations. The second heavily relies on the realization of design 
projects and leads to a conception of organizations as self-organizing networks of stakeholders. I 
am not suggesting that they cover the whole spectrum of social formations, or that they are 
mutually exclusive. I see these as providing vocabularies to talk about organizations non-
mechanistically. In either case, accounts of participation in social phenomena entail accounts from 
inside the phenomenon of interest and I am suggesting that inside accounts are necessary to 
preserve the possibility of human agency. 
  
Cognition as Networks of Operations – The Biological Basis of Human Agency 
For quite some time, Humberto Maturana (2008) with Francisco Varela (1988) have argued 
against theorizing human beings in violation of what we know of human biology. The human 
nervous system, they insist, is an anatomically and physiologically closed network of neuronal 
activity that operates recursively on itself, i.e., any changes within it leads to further changes within 
it. Sensors and effectors have dual characteristics. On the one hand, they operate as neuronal 
elements and as such participate in the activities of the nervous system. On the other hand, they 
respond to or act on something outside the nervous system. Sensors and effectors inside the 
organism interact with bodily phenomena. Sensors and effectors at the surface of the organism are 
in touch with the environment in which the organism resides. The nervous system is affected by 
sensory perturbations and affects the effectors in return – however, without being able to 
distinguish what causes the perturbations. 
It follows that it is impossible to see what is outside our sensors, only how the nervous 
system is perturbed by it. It is an illusion, therefore, to believe we could observe what is in front 
of our eyes. All we notice is the process of seeing, and what we see are the perturbations of the 
operations of the nervous system, i.e., when it operates unusually. 
The inability to have direct access to the world outside, only what we cognitively construct, 
is the starting point of Ernst von Glasersfeld's (1995, 2008) radical constructivism. Constructivism 
maintains that the inference from perceptual images to things supposed to exist independently of 
the constructive work of the human nervous system is unwarranted. We see only our own 
constructions of the world. Constructivist research, especially in educational settings, has shown 
what might on reflection be quite obvious, that the problems that students are facing, for example 
mathematical ones, can usually be solved by various cognitive constructions, coming to the same 
solution but by different means. In other words, being able to give correct answers to questions 
does not imply that students have learned the teacher's conceptions, only that their conceptions 
work or are, what von Glasersfeld calls, viable in an (educational) environment. Constructivist 
research grants human beings considerable freedom to construct any reality they please provided 
they work, or as Maturana would say, as long as the organism can maintain its autopoiesis, i.e., 
continues living. 
The biology of cognition insists that the human nervous system, being self-organizing, 
cannot be instructed the way a computer can be programmed. A teacher can say what she wants, 
but cannot cause particular cognitions to arise within the students. I call this property of the nervous 
system cognitive autonomy and maintain that it is a condition for human agency. 
One of the unique features of our nervous system is that we are mostly unaware of the 
arbitrariness of our reality constructions, until we encounter their non-viability. Forced to consider 
alternative constructions, we are momentarily cognizant of our cognitive autonomy, our ability to 
reconsider, reconceptualize, reconstruct and settle on a construction that works. But after this 
happens, we quickly forget what did not work in favor of what does and fall back thereby on the 
belief that our current construction is real. 
The notion of cognitive autonomy seems to contradict the experience of influence, the 
experience of one human being affecting another intentionally, which neither constructivism, nor 
the biology of cognition have adequately dealt with and cognitive science considers unproblematic 
as it builds on computation as a platform for exploring human cognition. Unlike humans, 
computers are organizationally wide open, i.e., programmable. Epistemologically, assuming 
cognitive constructions of reality to be ideally correct representation of what exists outside 
amounts to denying one's cognitive autonomy. Experientially, this assumption makes sense when 
cognitive constructions are not perturbed, and their enactment conforms to expectations. But it 
makes also sense when one is committed to maintain particular reality constructions in interaction 
with others who have a similar preference for their stability. Behaving predictable 
creates backdoors to influences from the outside. One of the most important backdoors to the 
cognition of others is learning and using language. Language, its meanings, requests, promises and 
warnings, is mostly used habitually. Children learn to speak Ôproperly' while doing things 
Ôproperly' before they are capable of making choices among linguistic expressions and actions. 
We speak of the meanings of words, having forgotten the history of using these words. Using 
language habitually is part of being a predictable member of a speech community that values 
consensual coordination of the body, speech and actions of its members. 
Thus, human agency resides between two seemingly conflicting ideals, cognitive 
autonomy and linguistic competence, between individual freedom of choice and socially 
constrained choices, between possibilities that can be experience or examined and habitual 
practices that are taken for granted or unquestioned. For example. the ability of linguistically 
inducing fear provides an entry to all kinds of influences geared to avoid bad things from 
happening. Even claiming to be free to make a particular choice, which occurs in language, rests 
on the common use of words whose meanings are not freely chosen. Agency can only be claimed 
on the ground of habitual elements. 
  
Organizations as Reconstitutable Networks of Conversations. 
I shall discuss four features of this conception of organization. 
First, reconstitutability. The history of theories of organization is a history of the use of 
metaphors for collective practices. The industrial revolution replaced feudalist metaphors – 
privileged elites expecting loyalty from servants who were locked in their position – to metaphors 
of the mastery of mechanisms with replaceable (human and non-human) parts. It created 
hierarchically controlled assembly lines, serving the needs of the owners of factories, the top 
authorities of bureaucracies or the commanders of armies. Human participants could be hired and 
replaced as needed. Then metaphors from biological organisms entered conceptions of 
organizations, encouraging the harmonious subordination of parts to the well being of the whole, 
functional differentiation, allowing both hierarchical and horizontal interactions to take place. 
While still dominant today, the biological metaphor is slowly undermined by metaphors of 
networks, communication nets in particular, which are flatter than hierarchical forms and treat the 
nodes in such networks equally – except for their connectivity. 
Common to all of these conceptions is that organizations persist in time, adapt or grow in 
certain directions (number of employees, size of the market, efficiency and wealth). The 
conception of this persistence may be encouraged by being housed in a certain building, making 
use of durable production equipment, being registered as a legal entity and using durable signs, 
logos, designs and names. I am questioning the idea that organization need to persist as functioning 
mechanisms, organisms or communication networks. Instead, I am suggesting that the central 
feature of all social organizations is their reconstitutability at different times, with same or different 
people, and perhaps at different locations. In understanding this feature, human agency is 
indispensable. 
Experientially, many organizations cease to exist at nights, on holidays or without us, but 
they may be reconstituted when the right kind of people meet at the right time, such as when the 
same employees show up for work at 9 am or when a family comes together after everyone worked 
at different places. Continuing employees know each other and when they come together again 
after a period of absence, they may continue where they had stopped. The seminar I am teaching 
meets twice a week for one and a half hour each. During the semester, I am confident that this 
seminar will be reconstituted at scheduled times. Outside that time, each of us participates in other 
organizations, student meetings, faculty committees, restaurants during lunch hours, stores or in 
families. 
Not all organizations have continuing employees, their individual membership shifts from 
one set of actors to another. So, two soccer teams that have never played against each other meet 
on a soccer field and the organization Ôsoccer match' is born. A court of law comes into being 
when a case needs to be adjudicated, all required players are present and do what is expected of 
them. Organizations with discontinuous employees tend to institutionalize lasting signs for 
potential constituents to recognize each other as candidates for reconstituting a particular 
organization. The doctor's white coat, the police officer's flashing lights on their car, the shop 
keeper's place behind a counter, the judge sitting robed on an elevated desk – all of these 
institutionalized signs serve to indicate a social actor's ability, willingness or privilege to 
participate in the reconstitution of the signed organization. When such signs are reliable and match 
across potential participants, it is easy for everyone to fall into their place within an organization. 
Another set of signs are structures with open places, a bus, a church, an office building – which 
invite actors to take up places in them and thereby reconstitute a means of public transportation, a 
religious service and a working office respectively. 
Reconstitutability distinguishes social organizations from machines, whose parts are 
permanently in place or engaged, and from organisms that must maintain their uninterrupted 
autopoiesis. Reconstitutability enables social organizations do dissolve themselves, remain 
dormant for a while and reconstitute themselves when needed. Social organizations without 
reconstitutability grant their members little if any choice which is typical for prisoners or slaves. 
Theories of organization that attend only to what its members (have to) do while being part of an 
organization flirt with totalitarianism by ignoring the role of human agency in two essential 
organizational phases. They ignore the human agency evident when reconstituting an organization, 
and they fail to recognize that members of organizations voluntarily, contractually and/or 
temporally surrender some of the agency they do possess to the larger organization. 
The ability to reconstitute itself supersedes all other conditions of an organization's 
viability. Organizations that do not reconstitute themselves or cannot for lack or human or material 
resources may remain dormant for a while but eventually die. 
Second, accountability. To obtain data in his study of the power elite in the U.S., C. 
Wright Mills (1939) decided to learn to know what happened inside that elite and ended up visiting 
boardrooms and observing meetings were decisions were made and implemented, and power was 
exerted and accepted. He soon realized that the traditional macro-theoretical conceptions of power 
were too simple, and discovered the richness of language – not in the conventional sense at a 
medium of influence, but – as the site where the meanings of decisions were created and dismissed. 
In a landmark paper, Mills (1940) described the vocabulary of motives that decision makers use 
to justify their decisions and actions. His approach developed further (Scott & Lyman, 1968, 
Buttny, 1993) and is now discussed in terms of accountability. It describes human agency not in 
terms of individual/psychological conceptions (awareness of alternatives, criteria of decision 
making) but in terms of the accounts that human actors may be ask to give and offer in response, 
or may voluntarily offer in anticipation (if not fear) of being held accountable for what they say or 
do. The two accounts in which agency is defined are excuses and justifications, both conversational 
moves. 
Excuses admit that something untoward happened but are used by actors to deny their 
agency, appealing to causes not under their control, accidents, lack of information, or being under 
the influence of or command by someone else.Justifications, by contrast, acknowledge an actors' 
agency, and are offered by actors convinced of the virtue of their action, wanting to be sure that 
others see its virtue as well. The point of accounts is not whether they are true or false, but whether 
they are accepted as valid excuses or good justifications within the conversations in which they are 
offered. Acceptance of excuses defines the conditions under which agency is deniable. Acceptance 
of justifications certifies a speaker's agency but also that the action in question is virtuous. 
Accountability is the social manifestation of human agency – not defined by a detached observer, 
but allowed to be determined by those affected by the action. 
As an aside, texts cannot be held accountable for what they are, nor can technological 
artifacts offer accounts for what they do. This is one reason why I consider generalizing human 
agency to texts, images, and artifacts trivializes the concept of agency and needs to be ruled out. 
Third, networks of conversations. I am suggesting that all social organizations are 
realized (made real, come to life) in networks of conversations. Conversations are locally 
organized formations of more or less free flowing verbal interactions among a limited number of 
identifiable participants. The number of participants in a conversation is limited by the amount of 
attention individuals can devote to each other. A conversation is interactive, dialogue not 
monologue. Prototypically face-to-face, conversations also can take place by telephone and 
electronic communications. Granted, the possibility of meetings larger than what one usually calls 
conversations, union meetings, legislative sessions, ceremonial gatherings, or public protests, but 
these almost always are the outgrowth of preceding conversations. Even large weddings amount 
to numerous small conversations framed by and conversing about a ceremony. Conversations 
consist of speech acts, including requests, commitments and accounts that coordinate the activities 
and reality constructions by their participants. 
The realities that participants in conversations jointly create range from the establishment 
of conventions, mutual understandings, or building something collectively. Minimally, 
conversations create their own history of what happened, usually available to all participants, and 
often serving as the common background for future conversations. Conversations can yield 
commitments to act, divisions of labors, negotiated settlements, treaties or business agreements. 
Many conversations accompany and influence ongoing work, whether consuming food while 
involved in a dinner conversation, creating a text that satisfies all contributors or producing an 
artifact at an assembly line. 
Conversations become networked in at least three ways. First, members of a social 
organization may sequentially participate in several conversations within that organization, taking 
into current conversations what had transpired in preceding ones. Some organizations organize 
such networks according to principles of representation, such as when representatives of local 
working groups have departmental conversations, thus different connecting groups without direct 
conversations, ultimately meeting in the boardroom of a corporation. Second is the networking 
due to operational connections – such as when the products of one department serve as the starting 
point of another. This network tends to be more horizontal with the members at the boundaries of 
local conversations negotiating their interfaces. Third, is the sharing 
of documents and communication technology generated in one conversation and/or available to 
other conversations. Texts can coordinate conversations without direct human contact and serve 
regulative functions within an organization. There are also connections between an organization 
and its outside environment, which make use of all three ways to connect. Outsiders may be 
recruited to join an organization or be hired as experts, bringing with them expert knowledge, the 
histories of conversations outside that organization and familiarity with the voices of others. There 
typically exists much communication between an organization and its clients, establishing 
operational connections to the outside, often in writing. 
Fourth, text and technology. Networks of conversation also create, preserve and use texts 
and technologies of at least three kinds. 
Organizations' reconstitutability is enhanced and their stability is prolonged when the 
histories of conversations are not only remembered by their participants, but also written down in 
the form of protocols of what transpired in conversations, made available to continuing 
deliberations, especially to participants new to a conversation; in the form of rules of conduct that 
have proven useful in the past and are now generalized to other conversations; in the form 
of contracts to be honored by present and future members of the organization and agencies outside 
that organization. Some of these texts are required when the organization is considered a legal 
entity that insists on rights, assumes obligations and needs to conform to certain practices, such as 
paying taxes. All of these texts have memory and regulative functions, memory functions as they 
extend the accessible history of recurrent conversations beyond the lifespan of individual 
members, and regulative functions as they confine the conduct of individual members and direct 
the conversations in which they participate towards organizational goals. 
The network of conversation is operationalized by texts that are passed on across different 
networks, coordinating the relationships between different kinds of conversation, for example 
informing each other of the commitments made in one and impacting another, assuring that 
different conversations do not work at cross purposes. The operational meaning of texts may be 
codified in terms of hierarchies within the network of conversations, i.e., conversations that take 
place on different levels governing an organization and therefore have different effects on the 
operation of an organization. The further removed conversations are of each other, the more 
important are texts. 
Communication technology in the broader sense, including information technology and 
data bases, operationalizes the network of conversations within organizations as well, but unlike 
texts. The support they provide is infrastructural. Buildings, workplaces, telephone lines, data 
banks and computers relate to their contents as narrative structures and grammars relate to verbal 
expressions. They can accommodate the transmission, storage, retrieval and use of a great number 
of texts, but limit what can be communicated to where channels of communication are available, 
what can be stored in the form of durable records, retrieved, and applied to current conversations. 
To be texts, texts must be recognized as readable. To extend individual memories, provide 
guidance or inform, texts must also be read by individuals, which involves processes cultivated in 
a speech community or conversation. Similarly, to be an artifact of a certain kind, it must be 
identified as such. But to benefit from that artifact – whether it is a library, a medium of 
communication or a computer – requires the competence of users to interacting with it. It is not far 
fetched to extend the notion of literacy to the human use of technological artifacts, for example of 
computers. The difference between texts and technological artifacts is that the reading of texts is 
essentially personal, it informs a reader's behavior, whereas the interaction with artifacts not only 
informs their users about what they do but also affect the users' environment, including other 
people and the material world. 
I want to be explicitly denying agency to texts and artifacts. Texts do nothing without a 
reader, and their meanings vary with the conversations in which readers are involved and the 
speech communities of which they are a part. If a text informs, then only because of its readers' 
agency of reading it as such, if a text constrains then only because its readers construct them as 
such, if a text opens opportunities, then only because its readers create them with the help of the 
text. Meanings are not contained in texts. Texts do not speak, least of all for themselves. Reading 
demonstrates agency. 
The same must be said about technological artifacts. All artifacts are put in place by human 
agents. Most are controlled by human agents although some may proceed without further attention 
– thermostats, traffic signals, automatic pilots and algorithms for buying and selling on the stock 
market. Neither of these uses make artifacts into agents. Computers cannot account for what they 
do. They only do, efficiently perhaps, but without human intelligence. 
To pull these features of organizations into an example, let me describe my own 
organizational involvement. Being on the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania, I am 
participating in numerous but finite conversations. I participate in faculty meetings, teach seminars 
involving graduate students, advice students in private, am on doctoral committees discussing and 
debating dissertations, am member of various university wide committees, besides attending 
colloquia and enjoying social occasions. In these conversations I know what to say and how to 
respond to colleagues, students, administrators and acquaintances in my physical, academic, and 
functional proximity as well as through internet connections. I have an abstract idea of the 
university's organizational hierarchy and a concept of its mission. I can read applicable rules of 
conduct representing the history of how the university resolved past problems. I continuously 
renegotiate my identity within limits acceptable to others. I make commitments and keep them, 
and I employ speech acts to rearrange my environment in order to succeed in what I want to do. 
Should I violate written rules, I am sure to get a response from pertinent office holders, without 
necessarily knowing who that will be since individuals change their roles more often than the 
definition of their offices. The further my conversations are apart others the more I hear from them 
through writing only. I am reading their response in terms of the rules that make it possible for me 
to be a member of the faculty as well as the various conversations, some of which exceed the 
lifespan of most university employees. The university exists only because sufficient numbers and 
kinds of qualified individuals are willing to come together and reconstitute the network of 
conversations in which a university operates daily, weekly, monthly and yearly, and for which it 
provides the umbrella of a conceptual whole. Much of what I know about my university is written 
and inscribed in the buildings and technology that facilitate its network of conversations. No doubt, 
my conversations are different from that of faculty members in schools other than my own, in the 
faculty senate, in the administration, in the editorial boards of university and student publications. 
Maybe a university affords its employees more freedom than those in a manufacturing plant, but 
all organizations are grounded in what people say to each other and what their contributions mean 
to other participants. 
  
Organizations as Self-organizing Networks of Stakeholders 
I am sketching the approach taken towards a sociology of design (Krippendorff, 2006) in 
six key concepts. 
First, designers envision possible futures, including ways of life with artifacts they can 
design in environments build or influenced by others. Designers inquire what is currently variable 
and explore the feasibility of paths to proceed from a present state to a desirable future. Designers 
make decisions with potential impact on the world of others. They are agents and as such 
accountable to those potentially affected by their actions. 
Traditionally, designers were employed in industry, largely to render industrial products 
appealing, i.e., marketable for the benefit of their manufacturer, who simply took their ideas and 
saw to it that they were realized if profitable. Following the model of mass production or mass 
communication, designers were categorized as applied artists and users were considered merely 
consuming what industry provided them – much like the members of mass audiences who were 
construed as receivers of entertainment, subject to being told what to buy or how to vote. The 
outsourcing of design activities to independent design bureaus on the one side, the rise of consumer 
advocacy and environmental action groups, on the other side, and the shift towards a market driven 
democratic politics of production in the industrialized world have broadened the notion of design 
and quite radically changed the fabric in which technology is produced today. The production of 
the material culture of contemporary society requires a less corporate conception of social 
organization. 
Designers produce a particular kind of artifacts: Models, drawings, narratives, 
presentations, plans or suggestions of what might be realized in the future. These are artifacts by 
definition of being skillfully crafted, having materiality and could not come about by unattended 
nature. They are not final products, however. The artifacts that designers produce need to set in 
motion a process that promises to results in improvements of other people's lives through the 
realization of new technology, implementing new individual or social practices and usually both. 
The process that professional designers need to set in motion is organizational, without necessarily 
specifying the organization that could realize a design. 
I am not depicting professional designers as prime movers of technological development. 
Sometimes the ideas for desirable futures come from designers, sometimes from literature, science 
fiction, for example, and sometimes from industry. Regardless of what initiates such a process, 
being always future oriented and not explainable by natural laws involves an agency that we call 
design. Also, I do not wish to limit design to what professional designers do. Preparing a meal, 
writing an essay, planning a trip, furnishing one's living room, reconfiguring one's computer are 
as much design activities as are developing the machinery to manufacture material products or 
coming up with a marketing strategy to sell them. Design is a basic human practice through which 
we realize ourselves. However, design in the everyday conduct of life may not necessarily lead to 
social organizational forms, hence the need for a sociology in which design takes place, both 
professionally and mundane. 
Second, stakeholders. Designers typically are surrounded by intelligent professionals who 
have an interest in a design: clients, engineers, CEOs, financiers, sales people, and researchers who 
provide data in preparations for a design or experiment with prototypes. Design literature says 
little about them while much is written and argued about users. In fact, most of the professionals 
just mentioned talk about THE user, as if they were familiar with that typical individual, as if he 
or she existed, and as if THE user were the termination point of all design concerns. User-
friendliness is an important sales argument. A quality called "usability" has recently entered design 
discourse, and the phrase "user-centered design" is to suggest whom designers need to address. To 
me, users are stakeholders as well and typically consist of a great diversity of people. Moreover, 
users are not the target of all design concerns. Users work with maintenance professional, second-
hand users and recyclers. 
More generally, stakeholders 
          Are able to claim their stake (interest) in a particular design, the technology of which a 
design is a part or a project being proposed. This makes stakeholders political actors in 
pursuit of their own agendas. Stakes are not only economic. They may be political, 
cultural, aesthetic, moral, etc. 
          Are able and willing to mobilize resources for or against a proposed design: information, 
expertise, money, time, connections to members of their communities, and power of the 
institutional roles they occupy 
          Are able to affect changes in the world, transforming something into something else, 
whether accomplishing a step in the realization of a design, selling a product, getting a 
candidate for political office elected or getting other stakeholders involved 
          Are intelligent agents in their own worlds, experts, not mere recipients of instructions, and 
knowledgeable of and sensitive to the world of others 
          Are open to delayed gratification for what they do. For example, drug companies need to 
spend much for the development of a drug before they are able to reap benefits. 
Environmental advocacy groups think in terms of the costs and benefits to future generations 
of a design. Since design concerns futures so are the benefits 
          May be individuals, small groups or large organizations acting as a unit 
          Emerge whenever opportunities become evident or undesirable prospects become apparent 
and they disappear when possibilities are exhausted. 
For example, the Coca Cola Company once announced that it would discontinue 
production of its traditional formula. Stakeholders popped up everywhere and forced the 
company to keep the beverage on the market, now called Coca Cola Classic. Having 
accomplished their mission, the stakeholders disappeared. Or, whenever a new technology comes 
on the market, numerous secondary industries cease on the opportunities of producing gadgets 
that make that technology more useful. For example, the wide spread use of computers has 
brought forth software developers, service providers and invited the manufacture of innumerable 
gadgets, volume-wise exceeding the production of computers. Stakeholders may compete by 
providing alternative solutions to problems. They may also develop cooperative, even corporate 
structures to more efficiently utilize the possibilities available to them. 
Designers are advocates of their designs and hence stakeholders as well. They do not 
necessary require a special category as almost all stakeholders embrace some design activity. 
Third, artifacts – things skillfully manufactured, not causally explainable – undergo 
numerous transformations in the process of their realization. Designers may convert problems or 
ideas into compelling proposals. Their clients take the designs they like and distribute them with 
their stamp of approval to those who matter. Engineers convert agreed upon functions into the 
production drawings of working mechanisms. Manufacturers use these drawings, to convert 
available materials and parts into tangible products. Salespeople treat these products as 
merchandise and convert them into deals. Consumers utilize goods, much as users transform new 
artifacts into used ones. Recyclers take retired artifacts apart and profit from knowing what can 
be recycled. Advocacy groups publicize, criticize, or judge the ecology of artifacts and their 
human uses with the aim of changing this ecology by means of changing public perceptions of 
what it does. 
In effect, all stakeholders respond to manifestations of artifacts and transform them into 
other manifestations. This applies to the weakest case of approving or disapproving a design and 
thereby influencing how it will proceed, and the strongest of seeing something realized, 
assembling an automobile, for example. 
Any artifact – a model, production drawings, work orders, parts to be assembled, an 
advertising image, a product in use or discarded – is always a temporally frozen manifestation of 
a process of material transformation from one form to another. Stakeholders claim a stake in 
some such transformations, increase the negentropy of the manifestations obtained pass their 
results to another stakeholder. It is not so that these manifestations Ôrepresent' the final product 
symbolically or semiotically. In fact the final manifestation of any artifact is its entropic state, its 
degradation into the ecology that no stakeholder can entirely stop. I suppose the transformation 
that a stakeholder accomplishes is analogue to Callon's (1986) "translation." 
Fourth, networks of stakeholders. Mapping the process of developing and producing 
technological artifacts yields a network of transitions from transformation accomplished in the 
world of one stakeholder to that of another. During the industrial era and to some extend in large 
corporation, designers could still speak of designing products, since their specifications, once 
accepted, would enter a production plan that left workers no choice but to do what it demanded 
of them, yielding products that designers could anticipate in considerable detail. In the 
contemporary world, stakeholders bid for doing a job, and networks of stakeholders emerge in 
negotiations (conversations) across their boundaries, organize themselves by balancing 
individual with common interests in getting something accomplished, for example, on the market 
and beyond. Networks of stakeholders organize themselves around opportunities that they 
provide for each other. 
The shift from a rational and centrally controlled system of production to self-organizing 
networks of stake holders is also observable in a shift from describing social networks in 
mechanistic terms, as ANT proposes, to describing the cooperative constitution of networks by 
human agents who are accountable to each other. In the understanding of design this shift is 
correlated with a change in understanding design from a technical or rational problem-solving 
activity (Simon, 1969/2001) to a social process that relies on stakeholders with different and 
potentially conflicting interests. Rittel's distinction between tame and wicked problems (Rittel and 
Webber, 1984) is a clear statement of this difference; and the recent effort of replacing the 
monologic of traditional designers by participatory processes reflects this shift as well. There is a 
recognition that projects in architecture, city planning, electronic networks – all touching the lives 
of typically many different stakeholders – can not be completed by any one authority but requires 
enrolling diverse stakeholders, appeasing opponents or converting them into supporters, 
negotiating across diverse perspectives, utilizing confliction expert knowledges, in short either 
relying on stakeholders to move the development of an artifact forward, or simply fail. 
In stakeholder networks, designers may not occupy privileged positions, they have their 
own stake in the process of realizing a design and as in all political processes, this may involve 
making compromises in order to get their design through the network of involved stakeholders. 
Fifth, projects are overarching conceptions within which stakeholders can find their places 
relative to each other. Projects cannot be designed the way a machine can be engineered. they may 
be proposed and when accepted as a framework of cooperation among stakeholders, a project may 
well take a life of its own. Viable projects – viable in the sense of yielding tangible results – need 
          To have a point, a narrative, sharable among stakeholders, that spells out the purpose or 
direction of their cooperation, which may well transcend the life of its human constituents 
          To provide places for competent stakeholders to feel invited to participate, to get involved 
          To offer stakeholders a degree of autonomy to manage their own world including 
negotiating the manner of their participation and position in the stakeholder network 
          To create a degree of commitment, stakeholders' willingness to use their resources beyond 
immediate benefits, assuring some stability in the face of imperfections in the network 
          To be fuelled by possibilities that competing projects may not provide. 
Sixth, possibilities. Seeing possibilities probably is the most important fuel for 
stakeholders to become part of a project, form networks and cooperating with each other. What 
are possibilities? For example, and as suggested above, professional designers create spaces 
within which alternative futures can be examined and paths to them can be evaluated and 
ultimately proposed. Possibilities are the creation of human agents, not limited to professional 
designers. Exercising human agency is being human. For a short time, people may suspend their 
agency, committing themselves to work machine-like, for example on an assembly line, during a 
psychological experiment, or in a social organization (such as describable in ANT terms), but 
when this is not a choice, as in a prison, the situation is inhuman. As I said elsewhere, "Design 
constitutes being human" (Krippendorff, 2006:74). The ability to design once own world is 
intrinsically motivation – not just for professional designers, but for all stakeholders in a project. 
Stakeholders would not participate unless they can recognize possibilities that are meaningful to 
them, unless they can exercise some of their agency, unless they can design some aspects of their 
world. Recognizing meaningful possibilities is the primary motivation for the reconstitutability 
of social organizations and for stakeholders to cooperate. 
Possibilities do not reside in matter but in language and individual cognition. One can 
talk about visions, about desirable futures and expected benefits. Designers have methods to 
create design spaces. Brainstorming is a method used within development teams, even computers 
can generate alternatives one may not be able to envision in full. The most important feature of 
the proposals that designers put forth, the justifications they offer for their virtue, the projects 
they launch, the advice they give is that they entail possibilities that their stakeholders can realize 
in their own terms and for their own benefits – or no organization, no network of stakeholders 
will form. And since designers are but one stakeholder in a network of transformations, all 
stakeholders need to be able to utilize some of the possibilities for their benefit while passing on 
other possibilities to subsequent stakeholders until all of them are exhausted and the 
transformations are outside human agency. 
A design that does not find a producer, a product that does not find a sales person, a tool 
that does not provide possibilities for use, will not be realized. the same is true for legislative 
ideas, educational projects and plans to improve city life. Social organizations that do not 
distribute possibilities to their individual members can not reconstitute themselves and die. 
  
Summary 
In this essay I approached the phenomenon of social organization from the position of 
their active participants, not as observers – whether detached or aware of their 
conceptual contribution – from the position of which, I maintain, social organizations 
always appear holistic, deterministic and abstract, not the result of human actions. I 
began to root human agency in cognition, suggesting conditions of awareness of the 
constructedness of the world. Then, I sketched two conceptions of social organization. 
The first was based on human agency that is realized in languaging social organization 
into being. The second was derived from the kind of cooperation among stakeholders 
that emerges in the production of material culture. The two conceptions are as of now 
incomplete and their overlaps are not sufficiently explored. However, I consider them 
to provide attractive conceptions, hopefully contributing to discussing social 
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